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CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT, EXTRAPOLATION, AND RISK
Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny 1
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, stock market analysts have argued that value strategies outperform the
market (Graham and Dodd, 1934). These value strategies call for buying stocks that have low
prices relative to earnings, dividends, historical prices, book assets or other measures of value. In
recent years, value strategies have attracted academic attention as well. Basu (1977); Jaffe, Keim,
and Westerfield (1989); Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991); and Fama and French (1992a)
have shown that stocks with high earnings price ratios earn higher returns. De Bondt and Thaler
(1985, 1987) have argued that extreme losers outperform the market over the subsequent several
years. Despite considerable criticism (Chan, 1988; and Ball and Kothari, 1989), their analysis has
generally stood up to the tests (Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter, 1992). Rosenberg, Reid, and
Lanstein (1984) show that stocks with high book relative to market values of assets outperform
the market. Further work (Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991; Fama and French, 1992a), has
both extended and refined these results. Finally, Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) show
that a high ratio of cash flow to price also predicts higher returns. Interestingly, many of these
results have been obtained for both the U.S. and Japan. Certain types of value strategies, then,
appear to beat the market.
While there is some agreement that value strategies work, the interpretation of why they
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work is more controversial. Value strategies might work because they are contrarian to "naive"2
strategies followed by other investors. These naive strategies might range from extrapolating past
earnings growth too far into the future, to assuming a trend in stock prices, to overreacting to
good or bad news, or to simply equating a good investment with a well-run company irrespective
of price. Regardless of the reason, some investors tend to get overly excited about stocks that
have done very well in the past, buy them up, and these "glamour" stocks become overpriced.
Similarly, they overreact to stocks that have done very badly, oversell them, and these out-of-
favor "value" stocks become underpriced. Contrarian investors bet against such naive investors.
Because contrarian strategies invest disproportionately in stocks that are underpriced, and
underinvest in stocks that are overpriced, they outperform the market (see De Bondt and Thaler,
1985).
An alternative explanation of why value strategies work, argued most forcefully by Fama
and French (1992), is that they are fundamentally riskier . That is, investors in value stocks, such
as high book to market stocks, tend to bear higher fundamental risk of some sort, and their
higher average returns are simply compensation for this risk. This argument was also used by
critics of De Bondt and Thaler (Chan, 1988; and Ball and Kothari, 1989) to dismiss the
overreaction story. Whether value strategies work because they are contrarian to naive strategies
or because they are fundamentally riskier remains an open question.
In this paper, we try to shed further light on the two potential explanations for why value
strategies work. We do so along two directions. First, we examine more closely the predictions
of the contrarian model. In particular, one natural version of the contrarian model argues that
the overpriced glamour stocks are those which, first, have performed well in the past, and,
second, are expected by the market to perform well in the future. Similarly, the underpriced out-
of-favor or value stocks are those that have performed poorly in the past and are expected to
continue to perform poorly. Value strategies that bet against those investors who extrapolate
past performance produce superior returns. In principle, this version of the contrarian model is
testable because past performance and expectation of future performance are two separate and
2What we call "naive strategies" is also sometimes referred to as "popular models" (Shiller,
1984) and "noise" (Black, 1986).
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separately measurable characteristics of glamour and value.
In this paper, past performance is measured using information on past growth in sales,
earnings, operating income, and cash flow, and expected performance is measured by multiples of
price to current earnings, operating income, and cash flow. We then examine the predictions of
the contrarian model, namely that out-of-favor or value stocks indeed outperform glamour stocks.
We start with simple one-way classifications of glamour and value that rely on measures of either
past growth or expected future growth. We then move on to the more theoretically justified
classifications in which glamour and value are defined using both past growth and current
multiples. In addition, we compare past, expected, and future growth of glamour (and value)
stocks to see if their expected growth rates are similar to past growth rates and higher (lower)
than actual future growth rates, as our version of the contrarian model predicts. We show that a
wide range of value strategies produce higher returns, and that the pattern of returns, and of
past, expected, and actual growth rates are consistent with the contrarian model.
The second question we ask is whether value stocks are indeed fundamentally riskier than
glamour stocks. To be fundamentally riskier, value stocks must underperform glamour stocks
with some regularity, and particularly in the states of the world when the marginal utility of
consumption is high. This view of risk motivates our tests. We look at the frequency of superior
(and inferior) performance of value strategies, as well as at their performance in bad states of the
world, such as extreme down markets and economic recessions. We also look at the betas and
standard deviations of value and glamour strategies. We find little if any support for the view
that value strategies are fundamentally riskier.
Our results raise the obvious question of how the higher expected returns on value
strategies could have continued if such strategies are not fundamentally riskier?
We present some possible explanations that rely both on behavioral strategies favored by
individual investors and on agency problems plaguing institutional investors.
The next section of the paper briefly discusses our methodology. Section III examines a
variety of one variable measures of glamour and value, including book to market ratio, cash flow
to price ratio, earnings to price ratio, and past growth in sales. It shows that virtually all
contrarian strategies produce excess returns, and motivates our subsequent use of measures of
past and expected growth in combination. Section IV then examines the performance and other
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characteristics of theoretically superior contrarian strategies that are defined using both past
growth and current multiples. It shows that theoretically motivated contrarian strategies produce
higher returns than more ad hoc classifications, such as book to market. These value strategies
outperform glamour strategies by 8 percent per year. Moreover, the superior performance of
value stocks relative to glamour stocks does not diminish if we restrict our attention to the 50
percent or 20 percent largest stocks by market capitalization. Section V provides evidence that
contrarian strategies work because they exploit the extrapolation mistakes reflected in stock
prices. Specifically, the expected growth of glamour stocks relative to value stocks implicit in
their relative multiples significantly overestimates actual future growth. Section VI examines risk
characteristics of these value strategies and provides evidence that over longer horizons value
strategies outperform glamour strategies almost always, and do particularly well in "bad" states of
the world. This evidence provides no support for the hypothesis that value strategies are riskier.
Finally, section VII attempts to interpret our findings.
II. METHODOLOGY
The sample period covered in this study is from the end of April, 1963, to the end of April,
1990. Some of our formation strategies require 5 years of past accounting data. Consequently,
we look at portfolios formed every year starting at the end of April, 1968. We examine
subsequent performance and other characteristics of these portfolios for up to 5 years after
formation using returns data from CRSP and accounting data from COMPUSTAT (including the
research file). The universe of stocks is NYSE and AMEX. Since we require 5 years of past
data before including a company in the sample, the survival bias inherent in the way that
COMPUSTAT adds companies to its data base is to a large extent avoided (Banz and Breen,
1986).
Within each of our groups such as deciles based on book-to-market ratios, we equally
weight all the stocks. For each of our portfolios, we compute returns using a buy-and-hold
strategy for years +1, +2,..., +5 relative to the time of formation. If a stock disappears from
CRSP during a year, its return is replaced until the end of the year with the return on a
corresponding size decile portfolio. At the end of the year, the portfolio is rebalanced and each
surviving stock gets the same weight. (A stock that disappeared in the previous year is no longer
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part of the portfolio.) We also computed the results for 50% and 20% of the largest firms in our
universe. Such results are more indicative of realistic investment opportunities, especially for
institutional investors. Moreover, focusing on larger firms avoids potential selection biases in the
COMPUSTAT data base.
For most of our results, we present size-adjusted returns. To adjust for size, we first
identify, for every stock in the portfolio, its size decile at the formation time. We then construct
a size reference portfolio so that for every stock in the original portfolio we have a benchmark
which is its size reference portfolio. At the end of each year, we recompute the market
capitalization for each stock and update its size affiliation to obtain a more current size
benchmark. In computing the return on the benchmark portfolio we assume an annual buy-and-
hold strategy. The annual size-adjusted return on the original portfolio is then computed as the
return on that portfolio minus the return on the size reference portfolio.
In addition to returns for the various portfolios, we compute growth rates and multiples for
accounting measures such as sales, earnings, cash flow and operating income. All accounting
variables are taken from COMPUSTAT. Earnings are measured before extraordinary items, cash
flow is defined as earnings plus depreciation, and operating income is defined as earnings before
interest, taxes, and depreciation.
Let us illustrate our procedure for computing growth rates using the case of sales. To
compute the growth of sales in year -3 relative to formation, we consider a portfolio that invests
$1 in each stock, and look at the sales generated by this portfolio in years -4 and -3, and use the
percentage change as our growth measure. In this fashion, we compute the growth in sales for
every year prior and post formation. The 5-year growth rates we present are annual geometric
average growth rates. This procedure is appealing because it computes growth rates in
accounting measures in the same way as stock returns are computed, i.e., it gives each company
the same weight at the start of each year. Moreover, this portfolio approach to calculating
growth rates avoids the problems with outliers and with negative base year values present in the
more traditional approach where growth rates are computed for each stock and then averaged.
Finally, we compute several accounting ratios, such as cash flow to price and earnings to
price. These ratios are also used to classify individual stocks into different portfolios. For these
classifications, we consider only stocks with positive ratios of cash flow to price or earnings to
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price because negative ratios cannot be interpreted as reflecting expected growth rates. For
purposes other than classifying individual stocks into portfolios, these ratios are computed for the
entire equally-weighted portfolios, without eliminating negative values. For example, we compute
the total cash flow to price ratio for each stock and then take the average for the relevant
sample. This strategy gives us the cash flow per $1 invested in a portfolio where each stock
receives the same weight. Negative ratios for individual stocks do not present any special
problems.
III. SIMPLE GLAMOUR AND VALUE STRATEGIES
Table 1 presents the returns on a strategy that has received a lot of attention recently
(Fama and French 1992a), namely the book to market strategy. We divided the universe of
stocks annually into book to market deciles, where book value is taken from COMPUSTAT for
the end of the previous fiscal year, and market value is taken from CRSP as the market value of
equity at portfolio formation time. In general in this paper, we focus on long horizon returns (of
up to 5 years) on various strategies. The reason for looking at such long horizons is that we are
interested in performance of alternative investment strategies over horizons suitable for long term
investors. Moreover, we assume annual buy and hold periods in contrast to monthly buy and
hold periods assumed in most previous studies. Because of various market microstructure issues
as well as execution costs, our procedure produces returns that are closer to those that investors
can actually capture.
In Panel A of Table 1, we present the size-adjusted returns for years 1 through 5 after the
formation (AB1 through AB5), the average size-adjusted annual return (AAB), the size-adjusted
5 year return (CAB5), and the compounded 5 year raw return (C5). The numbers presented are
the averages across all formation periods in the sample. The results confirm and extend the
results established by Rosenberg et al (1984), Chan et al (1991), and Fama and French (1992a).
On average over the post-formation years, the low BM (glamour) stocks have an abnormal return
of -4.3 percent and the high BM (value) stocks have the abnormal return of 3.5 percent, a
difference of 7.8 percent per year. The extra return on value stocks relative to glamour stocks is
4.5 percent in the first year, 8.3 percent in the second year, 6.7 percent in the third year, 9.9
percent in the fourth year, and 9.8 percent in the fifth year. If portfolios are held with the
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limited rebalancing described above, then cumulatively value stocks outperform glamour stocks by
38.7 percent over years 1 through 5. Without adjusting for size, glamour stocks earned a five
year return of 56.5 percent versus 112.1 percent for value stocks. There is little doubt that,
during this time period, the BM value strategy substantially outperformed the glamour strategy.
The real question is what does the BM ratio really capture? Unfortunately, many different
factors are reflected in this ratio. A low BM may describe a company with a lot of intangible
assets, such as R&D capital, that are not reflected in the accounting book value because R&D is
expensed. A low BM can also describe a company with attractive growth opportunities that do
not enter the computation of book value, but do enter the market price. Also, a natural resource
company, such as an oil producer without good growth opportunities but with high temporary
profits, might have a low BM after an increase in oil prices. A stock whose risk is low and future
cash flows are discounted at a low rate would have a low BM as well. Finally, a low BM may
describe an overvalued glamour stock. The point here is simple: book to market is not a "clean"
variable uniquely identifiable with economically interpretable characteristics of the firms.
The more important of such economically interpretable characteristics are the market's
expectations of future growth and the past growth of these firms. To proxy for expected growth,
we use multiples of various measures of profitability to price, so that firms with lower multiples
have higher expected growth. The idea behind this is Gordon's formula that C/P = r - g, where
C is cash flow, P is price, r is discount rate and g is the expected growth rate of cash flow. A
similar formula applies to dividends, earnings, and operating income, except that their own
respective expected discount and growth rates should be used. According to this formula, holding
discount rates constant , 3 a high C/P firm has a low expected growth rate of cash flow, while a
low C/P firm has a high expected growth rate of cash flow, and similarly for the ratio of dividends
to price (DP), or cash flow to price (CP), and of operating income to price (OP). 4 In addition
3
In section VI, we compare risk characteristics, and hence appropriate discount rates, of the
various portfolios.
4Because of leverage, operating income is not a precise measure of cash flow that accrues to
shareholders. Consequently, we use OP multiples across firms as only a rough indicator of
differences in expected growth of operating income.
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to expected growth rates, we look at actual past growth rates of sales (SG), earnings (EG),
operating income (OG) and cash flow (CG). Because the book to market ratio does not
disentangle the past and the future growth, we look at variables that estimate the past and the
future growth separately.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the current multiples and past growth rates of BM portfolios.
The various multiples are in general much higher for value stocks than for glamour stocks. For
example, the extreme glamour stocks have a cash flow to price ratio of .059, which is about one-
third as large as this ratio for extreme value stocks (.172). This indicates that the expected
growth in cash flow is much higher for glamour stocks than for value stocks, or, put differently,
that glamour stocks are 3 times more expensive per dollar of cash flow than value stocks. But in
some cases, the most extreme value stocks have lower multiples than the less extreme value
stocks. For example, the EP ratio of the extreme BM value portfolio is the lowest. This might
be explained by the fact that the BM value portfolio contains many stocks whose earnings are
temporarily depressed, but are expected to recover at least partially. The high expected growth
rate of earnings of high BM stocks suggests that BM is not an ideal way to define a contrarian
strategy. Looking at five year past growth of BM deciles shows that low BM (glamour) stocks
have higher past growth rates than high BM (value) stocks. For example, the past growth rate of
cash flow is 26.9 percent per year higher for glamour stocks. The same pattern works for
operating income (see also Fama and French, 1992b). The results on past growth suggest that
the BM strategy is similar to a contrarian strategy in that it picks stocks with low past growth and
avoids stocks with high past growth.
In light of the ambiguity of the interpretation of BM, we move on to measures of expected
future growth rates and past growth rates as perhaps more direct ways to identify glamour and
value stocks. Table 2 presents the results of sorting on the ratio of cash flow to price (CP).
High CP stocks are identified with value stocks because their growth rate of cash flow is expected
to be low, or, alternatively, their prices are low per dollar of cash flow. Conversely, low CP
stocks are glamour stocks. On average, over the 5 post-formation years, first decile CP stocks
have an abnormal return of -4.9 percent per annum, whereas the tenth decile CP stocks have an
abnormal return of 3.9 percent per annum, for a difference of 8.8 percent. Over the five year
horizon, the difference in cumulative abnormal returns between lowest CP and highest CP
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portfolios is 42.9 percent, and that in cumulative raw returns is 95.1 percent. Sorting on CP is
thus a more effective value strategy by itself than sorting on book to market. If nothing else, this
result shows that there is nothing unique about BM as the basis for either a contrarian value
strategy or for a high expected return strategy.
The characteristics of CP deciles are similar to those of BM deciles. Multiples basically line
up with BM and increase with CP deciles. The results on past growth are also in general
consistent with glamour stocks having a superior past performance relative to value stocks,
although CP decile 1 stocks do not have the highest past growth. This suggests that the low CP
decile contains many stocks that have had low growth in the past but are expected to recover,
which are not the stocks which a contrarian strategy would pick out. Sorting on CP alone thus
does not give us a strategy that is always contrarian to extrapolation either.
An alternative popular multiple is the earnings price ratio, EP. Table 3 presents the results
for EP. On average, over the 5 post-formation years, first decile EP stocks have an abnormal
return of -3.5 percent, and tenth decile EP stocks have an abnormal return of 1.9 percent, for an
average difference of 5.4 percent. Over the five year horizon, this difference in abnormal returns
cumulates to 26.3 percent, whereas the cumulative difference in raw returns is 67.1 percent. Low
EP stocks underperform high EP stocks by a fairly wide margin, although the difference is not as
large as that between extreme BM or CP deciles. One possible reason for that is that earnings
are very noisy and often negative, which makes EP a poor proxy for identifying glamour and
value stocks.
An alternative way to get at glamour and value is to classify stocks based on past growth.
The extrapolation story, as well as the evidence discussed above, suggests that stocks with high
past growth are typically glamour stocks, and stocks with low past growth are out-of-favor or
value stocks. We measure past growth by growth in sales, GS, which is less volatile and less often
negative than either growth in cash flow or growth in earnings, particularly for stocks in the
extreme portfolios that we are most interested in. Still, sorting stocks into deciles by past growth
rates of sales is somewhat complicated. To reduce the noise from year-to-year sales growth
volatility, our classification of stocks into GS deciles is based on average rank of their sales
growth, rather than the raw growth number. Specifically, for each company for each of years -1,
-2,
..., -5 prior to formation we calculated the growth of sales in that year. Then, for each year,
CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT, EXTRAPOLATION, AND RISK 10
we rank all companies by growth in sales for that year. For each company, we then compute its
weighted average rank, giving the weight of 5 to its growth rank in year -1, the weight of 4 to its
growth rank in year -2, etc. Finally, we form deciles based on each stock's weighted average
growth of sales rank. This procedure is a crude way to both pick out stocks with consistently
high past growth in sales, and to give greater weight to more recent sales growth in ranking
stocks. 5
Table 4 presents the results for the GS strategy. On average, over the 5 post-formation
years, the low GS strategy earns an abnormal return of 2.2 percent, and the high GS strategy
earns the abnormal return of -2.4 percent. The cumulative difference in size-adjusted returns
over five years is 22.7 percent, and that in raw returns is 61.6 percent. The value strategy
outperforms the glamour strategy, on average, in each of the 5 post-formation years. These
magnitudes are not as dramatic as those for the BM and CP strategies, but show clearly that a
GS-based strategy can predict returns. Note that when we confine ourselves to the largest 50%
of all firms in Table 8, the GS strategy works as well as the BM strategy.
An examination of the characteristics of GS decile portfolios reveals several interesting
results. First, low GS stocks have an annualized sales growth of -3.5 percent over 5 years prior to
formation, compared to 12.5 percent for high GS firms. The multiples generally rise as GS rises,
except for decile ten where the multiples typically fall. Some of the fastest past growth stocks are
expected to slow down and hence have relatively low multiples, which suggests that sorting on GS
alone is, again, not an ideal contrarian strategy. The pattern of other past growth measures
across GS deciles largely follows the pattern of GS. In sum, sorting on GS alone gives us a
strategy that works as a value strategy, but does not necessarily coincide with an ideal contrarian
strategy. This is exactly what we would expect.
The results in this section suggest several conclusions. First, a variety of value strategies,
based on both multiples and past growth rates, produce superior returns. There is nothing
special about the book to market strategy or any other individual measure of value. Second, the
one way classification strategies do not appear to be the best way to identify glamour and value
5We have also tried a procedure in which we did not give the growth rate in more recent
years a higher weight in the ranking, and obtained very similar results.
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stocks, since they often bunch true glamour and value stocks with temporary winners and losers.
For example, low EP stocks, which are supposedly glamour stocks, include many stocks with
temporarily depressed earnings. These results point to the need for a theoretically better
definition of glamour and value, which takes account of both past growth and expectations of
future growth.
IV. ANATOMY OF A CONTRARIAN STRATEGY
Performance of Contrarian Strategies
For market participants to extrapolate the performance of a given stock, they must expect
its future performance to be similar to past performance. This means that a glamour stock would
be a stock with high growth in the past and expected continued high growth in the future. In this
section, we continue to associate high multiples of prices to earnings (dividends, operating
income, or cash flow) with high expected growth rate. Thus a glamour stock must have both high
past growth and a high multiple, not just one of these. A glamour stock must be distinguished
from a temporary loser, which had low growth in the past but is expected to recover and hence
has a high multiple. A glamour stock must also be distinguished from a temporary winner, which
had high growth in the past but is expected to slow down and hence has a low multiple. A value
stock must have had low growth in the past and be expected by the market to continue to grow
slowly, giving it a low multiple. The principle behind the contrarian strategy is that glamour
stocks are overpriced and value stocks are underpriced given their risk characteristics, and hence
an investor should buy value stocks and sell glamour stocks. The question is: do such
"theoretically motivated" contrarian strategies work better?
Table 5 presents the results for the strategy that sorts on both GS and CP. Since we are
sorting on two variables, sorting stocks into deciles on each variable is impractical. Accordingly,
we independently sort stocks into three groups (bottom 30%, middle 40% and top 30%) by GS
and by CP, and then take intersections resulting from the two classifications. Because the
classifications are done independently, extreme glamour and value portfolios (high GS, low CP
and low GS, high CP) contain greater than average numbers of stocks since GS and CP are
negatively correlated. The extreme glamour portfolio has the highest GS and the lowest CP rank,
and the extreme value portfolio has the lowest GS and the highest CP rank. These portfolios are
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listed in the first and last columns of Table 5.
In an average post-formation year in this sample, the glamour portfolio had an abnormal
size-adjusted return of -3.3 percent, and the value portfolio had the abnormal return of 5.4
percent, for a difference of 8.7 percent per year. In no post-formation year is the average
difference in returns between the extreme portfolios below 8 percent! Over the five post-
formation years, the cumulative difference in abnormal returns is 46 percent, and the cumulative
difference in raw returns is 99.9 percent. This difference in returns between the value and the
glamour strategies seems to us to be very large. It is larger, in particular, than the difference
predicted by the BM strategy or by the CP strategy alone. Interestingly, both CP and GS
contribute a great deal of explanatory power in these bivariate classifications. For example, low
CP stocks with low past sales growth, which we don't define as glamour stocks, yield a positive
abnormal return of .005, but low CP stocks with a high past sales growth, which we do define as
glamour stocks, have a future abnormal return of -.029.
Table 6 presents the results for a classification using both past growth rate in sales and the
earnings to price ratio. The average difference in returns over the 5 year period between the two
extreme portfolios is now 7.7 percent a year, which cumulatively amounts to 38.6 percent over 5
years in size-adjusted returns and 104.2 percent in raw returns. The EP X GS strategy works
much better than either the EP alone or the GS alone strategy, although not quite as well as the
CP X GS strategy. By comparing these returns to the low EP low GS group, and the high EP
high GS group, it is clear that both EP and GS contribute to a better selection of glamour and
value stocks. Moreover, even though the results from sorting on EP alone were not very strong,
the combination of EP and GS works almost as well as CP and GS, which suggests that in
combination with a variable that distinguishes past losers and past winners, such as GS, the EP
variable in fact separates glamour stocks from value stocks successfully.
Table 7 presents returns and other characteristics for portfolios classified by BM and growth
in sales. The results show that growth in sales has significant explanatory power for returns even
after sorting by BM. For example, within the set of firms whose BM ratios are the highest, the
average difference in returns between the low sales growth and high sales growth subgroups is
over 3% per year (4.1% vs. .9%). A similar result holds for the other two groups sorted by BM.
Note that these results do not appear to be driven by the role of the superimposed GS
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classification in creating a more precise partition of the firms by BM. The BM ratios across GS
subgroups are not very different.
In summary, the results of this section have established two propositions. First, the
amounts by which theoretically justified value strategies outperform glamour strategies are
extremely large. In many cases, they are on the order of 7 to 8 percent per year, and persist for
several years. Given the failure of standard fundamental risk measures to explain even small
differences in returns, it is hard to believe that 7 to 8 percent a year can be explained by risk.
Second, the results suggest that strategies explicitly constructed to be contrarian to extrapolation
of past growth produce higher abnormal returns than more ad hoc value strategies, such as that
based on book-to-market. This result suggests that value strategies might indeed work because
they are contrarian, rather than for some other reason.
Do these results apply as well to large stocks?
One objection to this analysis is that, even though we corrected the returns for size, the
superior returns of value stocks over glamour stocks might come from the smaller stocks. Larger
firms, however, are of greater interest for implementable trading strategies, especially for
institutional investors. These firms are more closely monitored, and hence might be more
efficiently priced. Moreover, various market microstructure biases in CRSP tapes and selection
biases in COMPUSTAT tapes should not be an issue with larger stocks.
Table 8 presents the summary of the previous analysis for the largest 50 percent of our
firms. Our previous results still hold for every method of sorting stocks into glamour and value,
and Table 8 illustrates that for GS, CP, CP X GS, BM, EP, and EP X GS. For the BM
classification, the average difference in returns between glamour and value during the post-
formation period is 6.7 percent per year. This difference for the CP X GS classification is 8.7
percent per year, which is the same as that obtained for all stocks. For the EP X GS
classification, the difference in average returns is 8.3 percent per year.
We have also done the analysis for the largest 20 percent of the stocks, which effectively
mimics the S&P 500, and got a very similar spread of returns between glamour and value stocks.
The conclusion is clear: our results apply to the largest stocks as well.
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Regression Analysis
Previous analysis has identified a variety of variables that can define glamour and value
portfolios. In this section, we ask which of these variables are significant in a multiple regression.
Table 9 presents the results of regressions of raw returns on the characteristics of stocks that we
have identified. Recall that, in our analysis, we have 22 portfolio formation periods. We run
regressions separately for each post-formation year, starting with +1 and ending with +5. Thus,
for post-formation year +1, we run 22 separate cross-sectional regressions in which the
dependent variable is the annual return on stock i and the independent variables are
characteristics of stock i. Then using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, the coefficients for
these 22 cross-sectional regressions are averaged and the t-statistics are computed. We similarly
run 22 regressions for year +2, +3, +4 and +5 after the formation. The results presented in
Table 9 are for the year +1.
We use the ratios of cash flow to price and of earnings to price in the regression analysis.
However, for many stocks these ratios are negative, and hence cannot be plausibly interpreted as
expected growth rates. We deal with this problem in the same way as Fama and French (1992a).
Specifically, we define variables CP+ and EP+ which are equal to zero when CP and EP are
negative, and are equal to CP and EP when they are positive. We also include in the regressions
dummies, called DCP and DEP, which take the value of 1 when CP and EP are negative,
respectively. This approach presents a crude way to treat observations with negative EP and CP
differently than observations with positive EP and CP.
The first result emerging from Table 9 is that, taken separately, each of GS, BM EP and
CP, although not SIZE, have a statistically significant predictive power on returns. These results
are in line with Fama and French (1992a), although on a stand alone basis CP and not BM is the
most significant variable. When we use the dependent variables in combination, the weakness of
BM relative to CP, EP and GS begins to emerge, and its coefficient drops significantly. For
example, when GS, CP and BM are included in the same regression, the first two are significant,
but BM is not. Similarly, when GS, EP and BM are included in the same regression, EP and GS
are significant, but BM is not. The variables that stand out in multiple regressions are GS and
CP, the value measures stressed in this paper.
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V. A TEST OF THE EXTRAPOLATION MODEL
So far we have shown that strategies contrarian to extrapolation earn high abnormal returns
relative to the market and to extrapolation strategies. We have not, however, provided any direct
evidence that extrapolation is indeed what characterizes glamour and value stocks. In this
subsection, we provide such evidence. The essence of extrapolation is that investors are
excessively optimistic about glamour stocks because they tie their expectations of future growth to
past growth, and excessively pessimistic about value stocks for the same reason. But if investors
make mistakes, these mistakes can presumably be detected in the data. A direct test of
extrapolation, then, is to look directly at actual future growth rates and to compare them to the
past growth rates and to the expected growth rates as implied by the multiples.
The information on past growth rates of sales, earnings, operating income and cash flow has
been provided already. Future growth rates of the same variables can be computed in a similar
fashion for years +1, +2, ..., +5, and for average growth. We can also compute the difference in
past or future growth rates between glamour and value stocks. To estimate expected growth
rates, we come back to Gordon's formula, which, for cash flow, takes the form, C/P = r - g,
where C/P is the ratio of cash flow to price, r is the discount rate of cash flow, and g is the
expected growth rate of cash flow. Using this formula, the difference between expected growth
rates of cash flow of a glamour and a value stock is just the difference in cash flow to price ratios
of these two stocks, assuming that their discount rates are the same, which we do for the
moment. Similarly, we proxy for the differences in expected growth rates of earnings and
operating income by the differences in earnings to price and operating income to price ratios. 6
The ratio of sales to price does not have the interpretation of an expected growth rate. Thus, for
cash flow, earnings, and operating income, we have a proxy for the difference in expected growth
rates between value and glamour based on differences in respective multiples.
Table 10 presents the results for two classifications of stocks, one based on BM and one
based on GS X CP. Starting with BM, the following patterns emerge from the Table. First, as
we know already, the past growth of glamour stocks by any measure is much faster than that of
6Recall that operating income does not measure the cash flow accruing to shareholders, and
hence OP is not as theoretically adequate a variable in this analysis as CP.
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value stocks. Second, the expected growth rate of glamour stocks is usually higher than that of
value stocks, although the difference in expected growth rates is not as high as that of past
growth rates. For example, cash flow of glamour stocks has grown 26.9 percent faster than cash
flow of value stocks, but is expected to grow only 11.3 percent faster in the future. Also,
operating income of glamour stocks is expected to outgrow that of value stocks by almost as
much as it did in the past. In contrast, while earnings of glamour stocks have grown much faster
than earnings of value stocks in the past, the market expects them to grow 2.5 percent slower in
the future. Market participants thus expect some, but far from complete, convergence of growth
rates between glamour and value stocks.
The most striking result comes from the comparison of these expected growth rates to
actual growth rates. The latter reveal clearly, that, contrary to the market's expectations, during
the post-formation years, glamour stocks did not grow faster than value stocks. For example,
while cash flow of glamour stocks was expected to grow 11.3 percent faster, it actually grew 3
percent slower. While operating income was expected to grow 22.6 percent faster for glamour
stocks, it actually grew .4 percent slower. Most remarkably, while earnings of glamour stocks
were expected to grow 2.5 percent slower than those of value stocks, in actuality they grew 38.6
percent slower per year. The expected growth rates show that market participants expect
glamour stocks to outgrow value stocks in the future, though not by as much as they have in the
past, and price them accordingly. Contrary to investors' expectations, however, there is little
persistence in the growth rates. Given their expectations, investors are disappointed in the
performance of glamour stocks relative to out-of-favor stocks. The results using the CP X GS
classification present a very similar picture. Again, glamour stocks have outgrown value stocks in
the past judging by any measure, including sales, earnings, operating income and cash flow. The
expectations of relative future growth rates are, if anything, even more optimistic than the
difference between past growth rates would suggest. For example, cash flow of glamour stocks
grew 15.8 percent faster than that of value stocks, but, judging by the multiples, is expected to
grow 19.9 percent faster per year, and similarly for earnings and operating income. In practice,
glamour stocks indeed grow faster than value stocks, but not nearly as much faster as expected.
For example, the cash flow of glamour stocks grows only 2.7 percent faster per year than that of
value stocks, compared to the market's expectation of a difference of 19.9 percent. Similarly, the
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difference in growth rates of earnings is negligible, even though the market expects the earnings
of glamour stocks to grow 6 percent faster. This result is very similar to that for the BM
classification. The market expects a much higher future growth rate from glamour than from
value stocks, and hence prices glamour stocks much higher than value stocks relative to their
earnings, cash flow, etc. In fact, glamour stocks do not grow nearly as fast relative to value
stocks as the market expects, disappointing market participants.
One other interesting observation emerges from this comparison of expected and actual
future growth rates using the GS X CP classification. That is, the difference in the growth rates
between glamour and value stocks in the first year after the portfolio formation is large,
particularly looking at earnings and operating income. This difference however shrinks rapidly
over time, and in many cases the growth rate eventually becomes higher for value stocks.
Similarly, if we compare the future growth in sales to past growth, we see the slow deterioration
of the relative performance of glamour stocks in all classifications. At the same time, if we look
at earnings, glamour stocks sometimes take a bath relative to value stocks right away. This
evidence suggests that according to some measures the market's belief about the continued
superior growth of glamour stocks is valid in the short run, even though for all measures the
market is too optimistic about glamour stocks in the long run.
In summary, the evidence in Table 10 is supportive of the extrapolation model. The
glamour stocks have historically grown fast in sales, earnings, cash flow, and operating income
relative to the value stocks. Market participants in general expect these differential growth rates
to continue, and in some cases to widen, and price glamour stocks accordingly. In the short run,
their expectations of continued superior growth of glamour stocks is borne out according to some
growth measures, though for other growth measures the forecasts are too optimistic even in the
short run. However, in the long run, the evidence shows quite clearly that growth rates of
glamour stocks either converge to the growth rates of value stocks, or even overshoot them and
become lower. This table suggests, then, that forecasts tend to be tied to past growth rates, and
at the same time tend to be far too optimistic for glamour stocks relative to value stocks. This,
of course, is precisely what the extrapolation model would predict. In this respect, the evidence
in Table 10 goes significantly beyond the customary evidence on returns in that it shows a
relationship between the past, the forecasted, and the actual future growth rates that is largely
CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT, EXTRAPOLATION, AND RISK 18
consistent with the predictions of the extrapolation model.
VI. ARE CONTRARIAN STRATEGIES RISKIER?
Two alternative theories have been proposed to explain why value strategies produce higher
returns. The first theory says that they do so because they are contrarian to extrapolation.
Section IV has produced evidence suggesting that indeed value strategies constructed. as
contrarian strategies produce higher returns than ad hoc value strategies. Section V further
showed that investors appear to be extrapolating the past, even though the future does not
warrant such extrapolation. The second explanation of the superior returns to value strategies is
that they expose investors to greater systematic risk. In this section, we test this theory directly.
Value stocks would be fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks if, first, they underperform
glamour stocks in some states of the world, and second, those are on average "bad" states, in
which the marginal utility of consumption is high, making value stocks unattractive to risk-averse
investors. This simple theory motivates our empirical approach.
To begin, we look at the consistency of performance of the value and glamour strategies
over time and ask how often value underperforms glamour. We then check whether the times
when value underperforms are recessions, times of severe market declines or otherwise "bad"
states of the world in which the marginal utility of consumption is high. These tests do not
provide much support for the view that value strategies are fundamentally riskier. Finally, we
look at some additional standard measures of risk, such as beta and the standard deviation of
returns, to compare value and glamour strategies.
Table 11 presents the results on the consistency of the performance of the value strategy
relative to the glamour strategy. We consider differences in returns between deciles (1,2) and
(9,10) for GS, (9,10) and (1,2) for CP and BM, and between groups (3,1) and (1,3) for GS x CP
over 1, 3, and 5 year holding horizons starting each year in the sample (1968, 1969, etc). The
results in Table 11 are based on raw returns. The results show that value strategies outperform
glamour strategies quite consistently. Using a 1 year horizon, value outperformed glamour in 13
out of 22 years using GS to classify deciles, in 17 out of 22 years using CP, in 19 out of 22 using
CP X GS, and in 17 out of 22 using BM. As we use longer horizons, the consistency of
performance of the value strategy relative to the glamour strategy increases. Over a 5 year
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horizon, the value strategy does worse than glamour in only 2 periods using the GS classification,
and in NO periods using the CP, GS X CP, or BM classifications. In this sample, over the 5 year
horizon, the value strategy was completely safe relative to the glamour strategy.
One could perhaps object to the raw return analysis since there are differences in market
capitalization between value and glamour stocks, and so the size effect could be driving the
results. Table 12 replicates the results in Table 11 using size-adjusted returns. Again, we see
inferior performance of the value strategy in only a few cases using the one year horizon, and in
no instances using the 5 year horizon unless GS is used as the sole classifier. The GS X CP
strategy, which is our preferred contrarian strategy, picks out a portfolio of value stocks that
always outperforms the portfolio of glamour stocks over a 5 year horizon. Incidentally, this
consistency result holds up also for both the top 50 percent and the top 20 percent of stocks by
market capitalization.
Given that value stocks underperform infrequently, do they at least underperform in
recessions, when the marginal utility of consumption is high? According to the NBER, there
were four notable recessions during our sample period: a mild one Dec 1969- Nov 1970, a very
deep one Nov 1973- March 1975, and also significant ones Jan 1980- Jul 1980 and Jul 1981- Nov
1982. An examination of Table 11 shows that the value strategy did about the same or somewhat
better than glamour just before and during the 1970 recession, did much better around the severe
recession of 1973-1975, did somewhat though not a lot worse in 1979-1980, and did significantly
better in 1981-1982. It is implausible to conclude from this that value strategies do particularly
badly in recessions, when the marginal utility of consumption is especially high.
A second way to look at precisely the same question is to compare the performance of
value and glamour portfolios in the worst months for the stock market as a whole. Table 13
presents the performance of our decile portfolios in each of 4 states of the world; the 25 worst
stock return months in the sample based on the equally-weighted index, the remaining 88
negative months other than the 25 worst, the 122 positive months other than the 25 best, and the
25 best months in the sample. The results in this table are clear. Using every single
classification, the value portfolio outperformed the glamour portfolio in the market's worst 25
months. For example, using the GS X CP classification, the value portfolio lost an average of 8.6
percent of its value in the worst 25 months, whereas the glamour portfolio lost 10.3 percent of its
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value. Similarly, using every single classification scheme, the value portfolio outperformed the
glamour portfolio and the index in the months in which the index declined. Using the GS X CP
classification, the value portfolio lost 1.5 percent in the months when the index declines,
compared to 2.9 percent for the glamour portfolio, and 2.3 percent for the index itself. So the
value strategy clearly does better when the market falls. The value strategy performs most closely
to the glamour strategy in the 122 positive months other than the best 25. In the very best
months, the value strategy significantly outperforms the glamour strategy and the index, but not
by as much as it does when the market falls sharply. Overall, the value strategy appears to do
somewhat better than the glamour strategy in all states and significantly better in some states. If
anything, the superior performance of the value strategy is skewed toward negative return months
rather than positive returns months. The evidence in Table 13 thus shows that the value strategy
does not expose investors to greater downside risk.
We have already shown that value rarely underperforms glamour for horizons of 1 year or
more and that the few instances when it does underperform do not typically coincide with
recessions. We have also shown that the relative performance of the value strategy is not worse
in "bad" states as defined by large stock market declines. On the other hand, perhaps there is
still a positive relation between the relative return on the value strategy and the degree of
prosperity in the economy. Investigating this relation is akin to the approach taken by various
APT researchers seeking to give their "factors" a basis in economic theory.
Tables 14 and 15 provide numbers analogous to those in Table 13 except now the states of
the world are realizations of real GNP growth and changes in the unemployment rate. The data
are quarterly, so that we have 88 quarters in the sample. These quarters are classified into 4
states of the world; the worst 10 quarters, the next worst 34 quarters, the best 10 quarters, and
the next best 34 quarters. The quarterly returns on the various glamour and value portfolios are
then matched up with the changes in macro variables for one quarter ahead, since evidence
indicates that the stock market leads these variables by approximately one quarter. Average
quarterly returns for each portfolio are then computed for each state.
The results in Tables 14 and 15 mirror the basic conclusions from Table 13; namely, that
the value strategy is not fundamentally riskier than the glamour strategy. For every classification
scheme, the value strategy performs at least as well as the glamour strategy in each of the 4 states
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and substantially better in most states. Unlike the results in Table 13, there is some tendency for
the relative returns on value to be higher in good states than in bad states, especially for extreme
good states. Roughly speaking, value stocks could be described as having higher up betas and
lower down betas than glamour stocks with respect to economic conditions. Importantly, while
the value strategy does disproportionately well in extreme good times, its performance in extreme
bad times is also quite impressive. Performance in extreme bad states is often the last refuge of
those claiming that a high return strategy must be riskier, even when conventional measures of
risk such as beta and standard deviation do not show it. Overall, the evidence indicates some
positive relation between relative performance of the value strategy and measures of prosperity,
but there are no significant traces of a conventional asset pricing equilibrium in which the higher
returns on the value strategy are compensation for higher fundamental risk.
Finally, Table 16 presents some summary risk characteristics of the decile portfolios using
our four classifications. These risk measures are calculated during the post-formation period
using annual measurement intervals. For the extreme value and glamour portfolios especially,
the pre-formation periods exhibit unusual behavior and hence might result in biased risk
measures (Ball and Kothari, 1989). For each of our portfolios, we have 22 annual observations
on its return in the year following the formation, and hence can compute the standard deviation
of returns. We also have corresponding returns on the value-weighted CRSP index and the risk
free asset, and hence can calculate a beta for each portfolio.
First, the betas of value portfolios with respect to the value weighted index tend to be about
.1 higher than the betas of the glamour portfolios. As we have seen earlier, the high betas
probably come from value stocks having higher "up" betas, and that if anything the superior
performance of the value strategy occurs disproportionally during "bad" realizations of the stock
market. Even if one takes an unreasonably strong pro-beta position, the difference in betas of .1
can explain the difference of returns of perhaps up to 1 percent per year, and surely not 8
percent that we find. The evidence on beta thus completes our findings that systematic risk, no
matter how measured, cannot explain the findings of this paper.
Table 16 also presents average annual standard deviations of the decile portfolio returns.
The results show that value portfolios have somewhat higher standard deviations of returns than
glamour portfolios. Using the CP X GS classification, the value portfolio has an average
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standard deviation of returns of 24.1 percent relative to 21.6 for the glamour portfolio. Closer
examination reveals that these differences in standard deviations may just be related to the
differences in betas we found or else to the differences in market capitalization of the firms in
the different portfolios. Judging from the average standard deviation of size-adjusted returns, the
value strategy looks no riskier than the glamour strategy, although both are riskier than the more
middle-of-the-road strategies. Fama and French (1992b) obtain similar results for the BM
strategy. Overall, it is hard to believe that the small differences in standard deviations that we
are finding can explain the 8 percent per year difference in average returns.
VII. SUMMARY AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS
The results in this paper establish (in varying degrees of detail) three propositions. First,
many different investment strategies that involve buying out-of-favor (value) stocks outperform
glamour strategies and the market. Second, the likely reason that these value strategies work so
well relative to the glamour strategies is the fact that the actual growth rates of earnings, sales etc
of glamour stocks relative to value stocks are much lower than they were in the past, or as the
multiples on those stocks indicate the market expects them to be. That is, market participants
appear to consistently overestimate future growth rates of glamour stocks relative to value stocks.
Third, using conventional approaches to fundamental risk, value strategies appear to be less risky
than glamour strategies. Reward for bearing fundamental risk does not seem to explain higher
average returns on value stocks than on glamour stocks.
While one can never reject the "metaphysical" version of the risk story, in which securities
that earn higher returns must by definition be fundamentally riskier, the weight of evidence
suggests a more straightforward model. In this model, out of favor (or value) stocks are
underpriced relative to their risk and return characteristics, and investing in them indeed earns
abnormal returns.
This conclusion raises the obvious question: how can the 7-8% per year in extra returns on
value stocks have persisted for so long? One possible explanation is that investors simply did not
know about them. This explanation has some plausibility in that quantitative portfolio selection
and evaluation are relatively recent activities. Most investors might not have been able, until
recently, to perform the analysis done in this paper. Of course, advocacy of value strategies is
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decades old, going back at least to Graham and Dodd. But such advocacy is usually not
accompanied by detailed statistical work, and hence might not be entirely persuasive, especially
since many other strategies are advocated as well. Still, the ignorance story is not completely
convincing given the general popularity of value investing.
Another possible explanation is that we have engaged in data snooping, and have just
identified an ex post pattern in the data. Several of our results and other pieces of evidence are
inconsistent with this hypothesis. First, we have shown that the theoretically motivated value
strategies work better than ad hoc value strategies. There is no reason for this to be true if we
just found an ex post pattern. Second, we presented evidence indicating that investors in glamour
stocks overestimate future growth rates relative to those of value stocks. There is no reason why
this prediction would be true if we just found an ex post pattern. Third, and most important, the
contrarian model has been tested, and confirmed, using data from other countries, such as Japan
(Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991). The same coincidence is less likely to materialize in
multiple countries.
We conjecture that the results in this paper can best be explained by the preference of both
individual and institutional investors for glamour strategies and by their avoidance of value
strategies. Below we suggest some reasons for this preference, which might potentially explain
the observed returns anomaly.
Individual investors might focus on glamour strategies for a variety of reasons. First, they
may make judgment errors and extrapolate past growth rates of glamour stocks, such as WAL-
MART or Home Depot, even when such growth rates are highly unlikely to persist in the future.
Putting excessive weight on recent past history, as opposed to a rational prior, is a common
judgment error in psychological experiments, and not just in the stock market. Alternatively,
individuals might just equate well-run firms with good investments regardless of price. After all,
how can you lose money on Microsoft or Walmart? Indeed, brokers always recommend "good"
companies, with "steady" earnings and dividend growth.
Presumably, the institutional investors should be somewhat more free from judgment biases
and excitement about "good companies" than individuals, and so should flock to value strategies.
But for several reasons, institutional investors might themselves prefer glamour stocks even if
they were less afflicted by extrapolation biases than individuals, which is far from certain. The
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reason is the agency context of institutional money management (see Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1992). For example, institutions might prefer glamour stocks because they appear to be
"prudent" investments, and hence are easy to justify to sponsors, who erroneously equate good
companies with good investments. Glamour stocks have done well in the past, and are unlikely
to become financially distressed in the near future, as opposed to value stocks, which have
previously done poorly and are more likely to run into financial problems. Many institutions
actually screen out stocks of financially distressed firms, many of which are value stocks, from the
universe of stocks they pick. Indeed, sponsors (because they themselves extrapolate) might
consider glamour stocks to be safer than value stocks, even though, as we have seen, a portfolio
of value stocks is actually less risky. The strategy of investing in glamour stocks, while appearing
"prudent," is not prudent at all in that it earns a lower expected return and is not fundamentally
less risky. Nonetheless, the agency problems between money managers and their sponsors would
cause money managers to tilt towards "glamour" stocks (Lakonishok et al, 1992).
Another important factor is that most investors have shorter time horizons than are
required for value strategies to consistently pay off. Many individuals look for stocks that will
earn them high abnormal returns within a few months, rather than 4 percent per year over the
next five years. Institutional money managers often have even shorter time horizons. They often
cannot afford to underperform the index or their peers for any non-trivial period of time, for if
they do, their sponsors will withdraw the funds. A value strategy that takes 3 to 5 years to pay
off but may underperform the market in the meantime (have a large tracking error) might simply
be too risky for money managers from the viewpoint of career concerns. If a money manager
fears getting fired before a value strategy pays off, he will avoid using such a strategy. When
both individuals and institutional money managers prefer glamour and avoid value strategies,
value stocks will be cheap and earn a higher average return.
Are the anomalous excess returns on value stocks likely to persist? It is possible that over
time more investors will become convinced of the value of being a contrarian with a long horizon
and the returns to our strategies will fall. Perhaps the recent move into disciplined quantitative
investment strategies, evaluated based only on performance and not on individual stock picks, will
increase the demand for value stocks and reduce the agency problems that result in picking
glamour stocks. Finally, the rapidly growing mutual funds are likely to be important investors
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pursuing value strategies, since they face less pressure to pick glamour stocks for clients than are
many investment advisors of pension funds. All of these factors might reduce the future returns
to value strategies as such strategies become less contrarian.
Perhaps the most interesting implication of the conjecture that many of the glamour stock
investors are money managers is that this may explain their inferior performance. In an earlier
paper, we have focused on the striking underperformance of pension fund money managers
relative to the market index (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992). The large difference in
returns on glamour and value can at least in principle explain how money managers can
underperform the market by over 100 basis points per year before accounting for management
fees. By looking at the actual portfolios of institutional money managers, one can find out
whether they are overinvested in glamour stocks and underinvested in value stocks. We plan to
do that in a follow-up paper.
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TABLE 1 : Decile Returns and Characteristics Based on Book-to-Market
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity. All numbers
presented in the table are averages over the 22 formation periods computed for corresponding
portfolios. ABi is the size-adjusted return in year i after formation, i = 1, .... 5. AAB is the average
over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-
size-adjusted-return. C5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-raw-return. BM, Size, EP, CP,
SP, OP, and DP, defined below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and pre-formation-year-
accounting. BM is the ratio of book-value-of-equity-to-market-value-of-equity. Size is the total-dollar
value of equity (in millions). EP is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-equity. CP is the ratio of
cash-flow-to-market-value-of-equity. SP is the ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-equity. OP is the ratio
of operating-income-to-market-value-of-equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-market-value-of-equity.
GE, GC, GS, and GO refer to pre-formation-5-year-average-growth rates of earnings, cash flow, sales,
and operating income, respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
1 23456789 10
AB1 -.022 -.019 -.002 -.013 -.007 .011 .008 .022 .031 .023
AB2 -.047 -.027 .003 .004 .011 .013 .020 .014 .030 .036
AB3 -.036 -.021 -.004 .009 .005 .009 .022 .036 .026 .031
AB4 -.055 -.017 -.016 .004 .016 .012 .027 .034 .045 .044
AB5 -.056 -.017 .003 .013 .008 .013 .046 .031 .032 .042
AAB -.043 -.020 -.003 .004 .006 .012 .024 .028 .033 .035
CAB5 -.199 -.098 -.016 .018 .032 .057 .128 .146 .175 .188
C5 .560 .802 .973 1.045 1.082 1.152 1.320 1.375 1.449 1.462
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
10
BM .225 .414 .556 .685 .810 .936 1.082 1.270 1.548 1.988
Size 663.3 563.6 508.8 447.6 430.3 394.4 386.5 304.3 209.2 120.0
EP .029 .059 .071 .079 .084 .089 .092 .083 .066 .004
CP .059 .100 .124 .145 .158 .173 .186 .186 .187 .172
SP .993 1.462 1.881 2.198 2.517 2.880 3.192 3.904 4.789 4.906
OP .116 .173 .212 .250 .274 .300 .322 .335 .347 .342
DP .012 .017 .022 .027 .032 .036 .038 .037 .033 .032
GE .309 .218 .185 .154 .126 .099 .083 .061 -.004 -.274
GC .234 .186 .159 .134 .108 .092 .079 .064 .035 -.035
GS .091 .114 .098 .092 .076 .070 .066 .057 .046 .030
GO .203 .178 .148 .126 .101 .088 .079 .068 .050 .028
TABLE 2: Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Based on Cash-Flow-to-Price
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
previous-year' s-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity. All numbers presented in the table are
averages over the 22 formation periods computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the size-
adjusted return in year i after formation, i = 1, . . ., 5. AAB is the average over 5-post-formation-years'-
size-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-retum. C5 is
the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-raw-return. BM, Size, EP, CP, SP, OP, and DP, defined
below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and pre-formation-year-accounting. BM is the ratio of
book-value-of-equrty-to-market-value-of-equity. Size is the total-dollar value of equity (in millions). EP
is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-equity. CP is the ratio of cash-flow-to-market-value-of-equity.
SP is the ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-equity. OP is the ratio of operating-income-to-market-value-
of-equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-market-value-of-equity. GE, GC, GS, and GO refer to pre-
formation-5-year-average-growth rates of earnings, cash flow, sales, and operating income,
respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
1 23456789 10
AB1 -.049 -.012 -.002 .000 .010 .009 .014 .032 .035 .035
AB2 -.061 -.030 -.015 .013 .013 .027 .031 .032 .028 .037
AB3 -.050 -.024 -.007 .012 .008 .029 .025 .033 .024 .032
AB4 -.042 -.038 -.007 .001 .009 .014 .026 .032 .056 .051
AB5 -.040 -.023 .000 .002 .022 .015 .028 .041 .045 .037
AAB -.049 -.025 -.006 .005 .013 .019 .025 .034 .037 .039
CAB5 -.220 -.120 -.031 .027 .065 .097 .130 .181 .201 .209
C5 .543 .779 .969 1.074 1.158 1.206 1.283 1.406 1.476 1.494
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
10
BM .526 .563 .680 .765 .851 .945 1.013 1.128 1.265 1.502
Size 438.2 463.3 428.6 421.4 394.3 393.0 399.9 439.9 407.5 263.3
EP .010 .047 .062 .078 .089 .097 .106 .117 .127 .131
CP .044 .081 .106 .128 .149 .171 .196 .226 .268 .345
SP 1.371 1,479 1.908 2.256 2.543 2.866 3.211 3.715 4.410 6.317
OP .091 .141 .184 .219 .255 .287 .326 .373 .441 .575
DP .012 .018 .021 .026 .030 .034 .036 .038 .039 .034
GE .172 .177 .160 .134 .123 .107 .106 .100 .095 .051
GC .113 .150 .139 .120 .113 .096 .097 .090 .089 .082
GS .046 .081 .084 .085 .083 .073 .073 .071 .069 .060
GO .108 .142 .132 .121 .110 .093 .094 .087 .087 .086
TABLE 3: Decile Returns and Characteristics Based on Earning-to-Price
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
previous year earnings to end-of-Aprii-market-value-of-equity. All numbers presented in the table are
averages over the 22 formation periods computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the size-
adjusted return in year i after formation, i = 1, .... 5. AAB is the average over 5-post-formation-
years'-size-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-return.
C5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-raw-return. BM, Size, EP, CP, SP, OP, and DP,
defined below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and pre-formation-year-accounting. BM is the
ratio of book-value-of-equity-to-market-value-of-equity. Size is the total-dollar value of equity (in
millions). EP is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-equity. CP is the ratio of cash-flow-to-market-
value-of-equity. SP is the ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-equity. OP is the ratio of operating-income-
to-market-value-of-equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-market-value-of-equity. GE, GC, GS, and GO
refer to pre-formation-5-year-average-growth rates of earnings, cash flow, sales, and operating income,
respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
1 23456789 10
AB1 -.019 -.012 -.001 -.007 -.006 .012 .024 .030 .042 .012
AB2 -.040 -.025 -.016 .001 .024 .018 .030 .029 .026 .012
AB3 -.037 -.023 -.003 .006 .007 .028 .027 .015 .011 .013
AB4 -.039 -.028 -.011 -.006 -.001 .000 .028 .028 .035 .036
AB5 -.040 -.030 -.011 .004 .002 .009 .023 .028 .033 .024
AAB -.035 -.024 -.009 -.001 .005 .013 .026 .026 .029 .019
CAB5 -.163 -.113 -.042 -.003 .027 .069 .138 .138 .155 .100
C5 .717 .808 .953 1.031 1.102 1.168 1.370 1.393 1.446 1.388
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
1 23456789 10
BM .716 .642 .694 .744 .821 .896 .982 1.072 1.184 1.401
Size 387.3 483.9 509.4 499.7 498.7 437.1 445.7 410.5 391.4 275.3
EP
CP
SP
OP
DP
GE
GC
GS
GO
.024 .049 .065 .079 .091 .102 .115 .130 .149 .181
.092 .106 .122 .140 .158 .176 .192 .218 .245 .307
2.165 7.895 2.052 2.152 2.376 2.664 2.947 3.339 3.816 5.336
.156 .172 .201 .231 .260 .293 .321 .366 .414 .522
.013 .017 .022 .028 .032 .035 .037 .040 .040 .038
.088 .138 .144 .128 .120 .117 .116 .119 .123 .139
.078 .122 .124 .116 .111 .106 .107 .106 .110 .120
.040 .073 .083 .083 .087 .081 .079 .080 .080 .977
.077 .115 .117 .111 .107 .100 .101 .104 .103 .115
TABLE 4: Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Based on Growth-in-Sales
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the pre-
formation 5 year weighted average rank of sales growth. All numbers presented in the table are
averages over the 22 formation periods computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the size-
adjusted return in year i after formation, i = 1, .... 5. AAB is the average over 5-post-formation-years'
size-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-return. C5 is
the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-raw-return. BM, Size, EP, CP, SP, OP, and DP, defined
below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and pre-formation-year-accounting. BM is the ratio of
book-value-of-equity-to-market-value-of-equity. Size is the total-dollar value of equity (in millions). EP
is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-equity. CP is the ratio of cash-flow-to-market-value-of-equity.
SP is the ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-equity. OP is the ratio of operating-income-to-market-value-
of-equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-market-value-of-equity. GE, GC, GS, and GO refer to pre-
formation-5-year-average-growth rates of earnings, cash flow, sales, and operating income,
respectively.
A. RETURNS
Value Glamour
1 23456789 10
AB1 .021 .025 .011 .019 .013 .007 .010 .019 -.002 -.028
AB2 .016 .017 .032 .018 .019 .013 .005 .007 .000 -.015
AB3 .020 .030 .022 .021 .018 .015 .003 .015 -.006 -.022
AB4 .032 .026 .031 .026 .019 .017 .003 -.002 .007 -.025
AB5 .020 .038 .028 .034 .006 .020 .017 .003 .003 -.028
AAB .022 .027 .025 .024 .015 .015 .008 .008 .000 -.024
CAB5 .114 .144 .131 .123 .078 .075 .040 .042 .002 -.113
C5 1.434 1.435 1.364 1.314 1.205 1.206 1.144 1.136 1.057 .818
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
8 9 10
BM 1.184 1.194 1.114 1.054 .990 .945 .900 .842 .760 .638
Size 198.3 332.3 388.4 413.2 461.4 499.2 508.8 536.5 567.2 545.1
EP -.029 .036 .055 .072 .079 .087 .087 .090 .092 .086
CP .078 .143 .153 .165 .169 .172 .167 .167 .160 .147
SP 4.280 4.100 3.699 3.448 3.159 3.031 2.928 2.858 2.616 2.227
OP .203 .275 .285 .292 .295 .299 .292 .293 .281 .259
DP .023 .032 .033 .035 .035 .034 .033 .030 .026 .019
GE -.187 -.019 .008 .043 .053 .075 .079 .099 .116 .141
GC -.022 .032 .047 .071 .087 .097 .109 .127 .152 .198
GS -.035 .001 .015 .026 .040 .050 .061 .074 .092 .125
GO -.028 .007 .023 .032 .049 .062 .070 .089 .105 .138
TABLE 5: Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Based on Cash-Flow-to-Price and Growth-in-Sales
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of
previous-year's-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and by the pre-formation-5-year-
weighted-average-rank-of-sales-growth. The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2
independent classifications. All numbers presented in the table are averages over the 22 formation
periods computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the size-adjusted return in year i after formation,
i = 1, .... 5. AAB is the average over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the
cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-retum. C5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-
years'-raw-return. BM, Size, EP, CP, SP, OP, and DP, defined below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-
equity and pre-formation-year-accounting. BM is the ratio of book-value-of-equity-to-market-value-of-
equity. Size is the total-dollar value of equity (in millions). EP is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-
equity. CP is the ratio of cash-flow-to-market-value-of-equity. SP is the ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-
equity. OP is the ratio of operating-income-to-market-value-of-equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-
market-value-of-equity. GE, GC. GS, and GO refer to pre-formation-5-year-average-growth rates of
earnings, cash flow, sales, and operating income, respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
CP 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
AB1 -.005 -.015 -.027 .028 .008 -.005 .054 .050 -.007
AB2 -.015 -.022 -.040 .031 .020 .017 .054 .026 .011
AB3 -.011 -.016 -.036 .031 .023 .000 .048 .026 .003
AB4 -.006 -.024 -.036 .030 .008 .011 .061 .041 .011
AB5 .005 -.021 -.029 .030 .013 -.010 .056 .038 .023
AAB -.006 -.020 -.033 .030 .014 .003 .054 .036 .008
CAB5 -.032 -.094 -.156 .160 .074 .013 .304 .193 .041
C5 1.122 .843 .712 1.419 1.200 1.076 1.711 1.497 1.163
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
CP 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
BM .898 .566 .385 1.074 .863 .710 1.414 1.269 1.148
Size 273.0 589.4 681.0 380.2 488.0 495.1 389.9 444.3 360.9
EP .020 .048 .054 .085 .097 .100 .114 .134 .142
CP .077 .084 .080 .166 .163 .159 .279 .278 .285
SP 2.450 1.539 1.115 3.200 2.571 2.446 5.279 4.604 4.470
OP .144 .148 .139 .270 .275 .274 .449 .463 .487
DP .022 .020 .014 .036 .035 .024 • 039 .042 .031
GE -.063 .069 .142 .050 .086 .142 .082 .108 .143
GC .018 .121 .205 .051 .097 .205 .047 .087 .140
GS -.018 .053 .112 .007 .057 .105 .013 .056 .106
GO -.028 .059 .131 .019 .068 .131 .035 .075 .118
TABLE 6: Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Based on Earning-to-Price and Growth-in-Sales
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of previous
year's earnings to end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and by the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-
rank-of-sales-growth. The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2 independent
classifications. All numbers presented in the table are averages over the 22 formation periods
computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the size-adjusted return in year i after formation,
i = 1 5. AAB is the average over S-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-retum. CAB5 is the
cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-return. C5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-
years'-raw-return. BM, Size, EP, CP, SP, OP, and DP, defined below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-
equity and pre-formation-year-accounting. BM is the ratio of book-value-of-equity-to-market-value-of-
equity. Size is the total-dollar value of equity (in millions). EP is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-
equity. CP is the ratio of cash-flow-to-market-value-of-equity. SP is the ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-
equity. OP is the ratio of operating-income-to-market-value-of-equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-
market-value-of-equity. GE, GC, GS, and GO refer to pre-formation-5-year-average-growth rates of
earnings, cash flow, sales, and operating income, respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
EP 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
AB1 .020 -.001 -.024 .028 .005 -.002 .051 .043 .020
AB2 -.004 -.016 -.035 .038 .022 .011 .041 .026 .015
AB3 -.002 -.012 -.034 .043 .018 .008 .026 .021 .010
AB4 .003 -.013 -.045 .027 .009 .002 .051 .041 .019
AB5 .007 -.012 -.045 .028 .012 -.008 .029 .039 .019
AAB .005 -.011 -.037 .033 .013 .002 .040 .034 .017
CAB5 .024 -.053 -.170 .174 .067 .009 .216 .182 .087
C5 1.315 .986 .674 1.533 1.230 1.063 1.716 1.523 1.365
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
EP 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
BM 1.077 .756 .454 1.127 .889 .692 1.409 1.252 1.129
Size 284.0 502.6 702.0 424.8 543.0 568.4 354.9 431.8 400.5
EP .044 .049 .051 .101 .099 .095 .154 .152 .158
CP .133 .118 .093 .186 .173 .155 .268 .257 .260
SP 3.236 2.280 1.365 3.267 2.518 2.239 4.807 4.169 4.040
OP .213 .195 .157 .299 .284 .262 .432 .429 .450
DP .022 .021 .014 .040 .038 .027 .042 .045 .035
GE .028 .105 .187 .070 .105 .161 .097 .120 .169
GC .025 .094 .181 .061 .096 .153 .074 .103 .163
GS .000 .070 .152 .024 .077 .140 .025 .071 .139
GO .020 .090 .182 .047 .092 .155 .059 .097 .160
TABLE 7: Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Based on Book-to-Market and Growth-in-Sales
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of end-of-
previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and by the pre-formation-5-
year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales-growth. The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2
independent classifications. All numbers presented in the table are averages over the 22 formation
periods computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the size-adjusted return in year i after formation,
i = 1 5. AAB is the average over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the
cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-size-adjusted-return. C5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-
years'-raw-return. BM, Size, EP, CP, SP, OP, and DP, defined below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-
equity and pre-formation-year-accounting. BM is the ratio of book-value-of-equity-to-market-value-of-
equity. Size is the total-dollar value of equity (in millions). EP is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-
equity. CP is the ratio of cash-flow-to-market-value-of-equity. SP is the ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-
equity. OP is the ratio of operating-income-to-market-value-of-equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-
market-value-of-equity. GE, GC, GS, and GO refer to pre-formation-5-year-average-growth rates of
earnings, cash flow, sales, and operating income, respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
BM 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
AB1 -.003 -.005 -.013 .010 .009 -.026 .038 .038 .003
AB2 -.017 -.007 -.019 .016 .019 .000 .038 .016 .021
AB3 -.017 -.008 -.021 .024 .017 -.016 .037 .028 .017
AB4 -.007 -.020 -.023 .028 .014 -.005 .044 .033 .034
AB5 -.001 -.019 -.029 .034 .018 .003 .041 .037 .009
AAB -.009 -.012 -.021 .022 .015 -.009 .039 .030 .017
CAB5 -.044 -.058 -.100 .116 .079 -.043 .213 .160 .087
C5 .974 .925 .842 1.325 1.224 .990 1.018 1.387 1.171
R36 .719 .966 1.387 .378 .500 .618 .048 .131 .129
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
BM 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
BM .425 .440 .392 .912 .884 .849 1.66 1.55 1.50
Size 514.7 749.8 704.2 432.7 477.1 449.0 199.0 284.3 274.9
EP .018 .064 .068 .065 .099 .111 .026 .092 .115
CP .074 .106 .105 .145 .180 .194 .160 .226 .248
SP 1.968 1.490 1.360 2.738 2.650 2.861 5.400 5.237 5.287
OP .160 .179 .176 .253 .303 .337 .312 .414 .477
DP .019 .022 .016 .035 .037 .029 .033 .038 .033
GE .083 .122 .159 .040 .081 .118 -.067 .039 .068
GC .177 .177 .180 .099 .103 .098 .013 .026 .040
GS -.020 .060 -.020 .101 .056 .003 .107 .053 .003
GO .034 .095 .143 .023 .066 .111 -.002 .026 .040
TABLE 8: Summary of Decile Returns for the Largest 50% of Stocks
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, the largest 50 percent of stocks by market
capitalization at that time are sorted into 9 or 10 groups. In panel 1, stocks are sorted into
deciles by the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales growth. In panel 2. stocks are
sorted into deciles by the ratio of last-year' s-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity. The
9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. In panel 3, all
stocks are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the
ratio of previous-year' s-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and by the pre-formation-
5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales growth. The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from
these 2 independent classifications. In panel 4, stocks are sorted into deciles by the ratio of last-
year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity. In panel 5, stocks are sorted
into deciles by the ratio of last-year' s-earnings-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity. In panel 6,
all stocks are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the
ratio of previous-year' s-earnings-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity and by the pre-formation-5-
year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales growth. The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from
these 2 independent classifications. All numbers presented in the table are averages over the 22
formation periods computed for corresponding portfolios. AAB is the average over 5-post-
formation-years-size-adjusted return. CAB5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-size-
adjusted. C5 is the cumulative over 5-post-formation-years'-raw return.
GS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAB .031 .036 .021 .023 .012 .009 -.003 .000 -.006 -.036
CAB5 .166 .194 .111 .123 .060 .043 -.016 .000 -.027 -.169
C5 1.247 1.321 1.188 1.199 1.118 1.073 1.010 .999 .968 .705
CP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAB -.052 -.030 -.007 .003 .015 .016 .017 .022 .030 .029
CAB5 -.235 -.142 -.034 .014 .078 .080 .087 .116 .158 .156
C5 .504 .723 .935 1.019 1.138 1.136 1.143 1.163 1.223 1.243
CP 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
AAB .001 -.020 -.039 .030 .010 .001 .048 .021 -.010
CAB5 .007 -.097 -.181 .160 .052 .002 .263 .110 -.049
C5 1.094 .799 .654 1.270 1.106 1.040 1.328 1.226 .934
BM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAB -.043 -.016 .001 .002 .007 .007 .017 .028 .036 .022
CAB5 -.198 -.077 .007 .012 .036 .036 .088 .146 .193 .113
C5 .566 .865 1.020 1.018 1.051 1.075 1.149 1.229 1.303 1.121
£E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAB -.042 -.028 -.011 .003 .005 .011 .020 .027 .029 .015
CAB5 -.194 -.131 -.052 .015 .026 .053 .106 .145 .153 .075
C5 .564 .704 .887 1.018 1.028 1.085 1.203 1.249 1.251 1.127
EP 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
AAB .012 -.011 -.037 .034 .012 -.002 .046 .031 .007
CAB5 .059 -.052 -.174 .184 .061 -.012 .252 .162 .036
C5 1.176 .894 .631 1.307 1.126 .997 1.344 1.301 1.124
TABLE 9: Regression of Returns on Characteristics for All Firms
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, we compute for every firm in the sample the 1 -year-holding-period
return starting at the end of April. We then run 22 cross-sectional regressions with these returns for each formation
period as dependent variables. The independent variables are 1) GS, the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average- rank-
of-sales growth; 2) BM, the ratio of end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-market-value-of-equity; 3) Size, the
end-of-April-natural-logarithm-of-market-value-of-equity (in millions); 4) EP+, equal to EP-the ratio of previous-year' s-
earnings-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity-if EP is positive-and to zero if EP is negative; 5) DEP equal to 1 if EP is
negative, and to zero if EP is positive; 6) CP+, equal to CP-the ratio of previous-year's-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-
value-of-equity-if CP is postive-and to zero if CP is negative; 7) DCP, equal to 1 if CP is negative, and to zero if CP is i
positive. The reported coefficients are averages over the 22 formation periods. The reported t-statistics are based on \
the cross-sectional variance of the 22 coefficients.
INT GS BM SIZE EP+ DEP CP+ DCP
Mean .180 -.061
T. ST. 3.251 -2.200
Mean .108 .039
T. ST. 2.167 2.132
Mean .185 -.009
T. ST. 2.140 -1.095
Mean .110 .526
T. ST. 2.029 2.541
Mean .099 .356
T. ST. 1.873 4.240
Mean .129 -.058 .006 .301 -.029
T. ST. 2.584 -2.832 .330 3.697 -1.222
Mean .143 .009 -.009 .280 -.032
T. ST. 1.562 .565 -1.148 4.223 -1.625
Mean .169 -.044 .000 -.009 .296 -.036
T. ST. 1.947 -2.125 .005 -1.062 4.553 -1.625
Mean .172 -.051 .016 -.009 .394 -.032
T. ST. 1.961 -2.527 1.036 -1.065 2.008 -1.940
TABLE 10: Past, Expected, and Future Growth: Glamour- Value
Panel 1: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio
of end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (BM), For each decile
portfolio, we compute 1) the average past 5-year-growth rate of sales, earnings, operating income, and cash
flow of the portfolio; 2) the future growth rate in years +1, . . ., +5 of sales, earnings, operating income, and
cash flow of the portfolio; and 3) the ratio of last year's earnings, operating income and cash flow to end-of-
April-market-value-equity-of-the-portfolio. The table presents the average over 22 formation periods
difference in all these variables between the lowest BM (glamour) and highest BM (value) decile portfolios.
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 portfolios of stocks are formed as follows. All
stocks are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of
previous-year*s-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-5-year-
weighted-average-rank-of- sales growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2
independent classifications. For each portfolio, we compute 1) the average past 5-year-growth rate of sales,
earnings, operating income, and cash flow of the portfolio; 2) the future growth rate in years +1, .... +5 of
sales, earnings, operating income, and cash flow of the portfolio; and 3) the ratio of last year's earnings,
operating income, and cash flow to end-of-April-market-value-equity-of-the-portfolio. The table presents the
average over 22 formation periods difference in all these variables between the lowest CP, highest GS
(glamour) and highest CP, lowest GS (value) portfolios.
A Past A Expected A 1-Year A 2-Year A 3-Year A 4-Year A 5-Year A Average
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
Panel 1:
BM
Sales
Earnings
Operating
Income
Cash Flow .269 .113 -.074 -.084 .004 .005 -.005 -.030
Panel 2:
CP
GS
Sales .089 X .116 .066 .056 .039 .036 .063
Earnings .060 .060 .276 -.093 -.127 -.028 -.022 .003
Operating .096 .310 .156 .023 .015 .011 .027 .046
Income
Cash Flow .158 .199 .024 -.015 .020 .017 .002 .027
.061 X .064 .042 .031 .039 .037 .042
.583 -.025 -1.149 -.553 -.203 -.124 -.108 -.386
.231 .226 -.024 -.018 -.004 .012 .015 -.004
TABLE 1 1 : Raw Returns Consistency: Value - Glamour
Panel 1: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the pre-
formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales growth (GS). For each portfolio, 1-, 3-, and 5-year-holding-period
returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 1 reports the difference in the 1-, 3-, and 5-year return
between the 2 lowest GS (value) and 2 highest GS (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
previous-year's-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP). For each portfolio, 1-, 3-, and 5-year-
hoiding-period returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 2 reports the difference in the 1-, 3-, and
5-year return between the 2 highest CP (value) and 2 lowest CP (glamour) portfolios. 4
Panel 3: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of previous-year's
cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-
sales growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. For each
portfolio, 1-, 3-, and 5-year-holding-period returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 3 reports the
difference in the 1-, 3-, and 5-year return between the lowest GS, highest CP (value) and the highest GS, lowest
CP (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (BM). For each portfolio, 1-, 3-,
and 5-year-holding-period returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 4 reports the difference in the
1-, 3-, and 5-year return between the highest BM (value) and lowest BM (glamour) decile portfolios.
PANEL 1 PANEL 2 PANEL 3 PANEL 4
GS 1,2-9, 10 CP 9, 10- 1, 2 GS-CP: 3, 1 - 1,3 BM :9, 10- 1 2
1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
1968 .130 .041 -.018 .022 .287 .474 .144 .153 .267 .098 .201 .344
1969 .070 -.097 .126 .123 .195 .410 .065 -.143 .283 .074 .070 .303
1970 -.108 .037 .193 .135 .246 .428 .002 .160 .356 .023 .032 .279
1971 -.059 .081 .231 -.078 .231 .478 -.144 .196 .531 -.108 .156 .463
1972 .074 .249 .544 .155 .319 .693 .134 .362 .932 .098 .328 .784
1973 .156 .424 .765 .021 .382 .846 .152 .702 1.416 .042 .450 .925
1974 .122 .488 .944 -.007 .496 1.343 .069 .650 1.597 .050 .642 1.726
1975 .261 .564 .311 .262 .816 1.310 .379 1.115 1.229 .418 1.034 1.182
1976 .030 .109 -.035 .174 .673 1.468 .217 .715 1.235 .132 .727 .993
1977 .146 .020 .308 .193 .247 .764 .219 .149 .844 .195 .181 .614
1978 -.002 -.029 .498 .048 -.106 .272 .039 -.072 .581 .037 -.264 .286
1979 -.062 .013 .332 -.168 -.102 .274 -.176 .098 .757 -.207 -.123 .569
1980 -.012 .650 .929 .039 .745 1.225 .110 1.246 2.000 -.034 1.066 1.676
1981 .154 .512 1.165 .203 .650 1.584 .236 .940 2.134 .185 .810 1.955
1982 .247 .394 1.304 -.032 .338 1.253 .118 .539 1.866 .240 .589 1.477
1983 .050 .167 .359 .204 .332 .851 .252 .578 1.470 .221 .256 .648
1984 -.126 -.090 .109 .192 .552 .888 .052 .641 1.092 .043 .324 .640
1985 -.081 .190 .301 .014 .322 .576 -.032 .531 .708 -.007 .237 .299
1986 .149 .288 .108 .339 .196 .427 .051 .149
1987 .075 .175 .093 .170 .111 .290 .078 .015
1988 -.009
.092 .089 -.037
1989 -.010
-.063 .010 -.207
TABLE 1 2: Size-Adjusted Returns Consistency: Value - Glamour
Panel 1: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the pre-
formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales growth (GS). For each portfolio, 1-, 3-, and 5-year holding-
period-size-adjusted returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 1 reports the difference in the 1
and 5-year size-adjusted return between the 2 lowest GS (value) and 2 highest GS (glamour) portfolios.
3-,
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
previous-year's-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP). For each portfolio, 1-, 3-, and 5-year-
holding-period-size-adjusted returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 2 reports the difference in
the 1-, 3-, and 5-year-size-adjusted return between the 2 highest CP (value) and 2 lowest CP (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 3: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of previous-year' s-
cash-flow-to-end-of-Aprii-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-
sales-growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. For each
portfolio, 1-, 3-, and 5-year-holding-period-size-adjusted returns are computed. For each formation period, panel
3 reports the difference in the 1-, 3-, and 5-year-size-adjusted return between the lowest GS, highest CP (value)
and the highest GS, lowest CP (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (BM). For each portfolio, 1-, 3-,
and 5-year-holding-period-size-adjusted returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 4 reports the
difference in the 1-, 3-, and 5-year-size-adjusted return between the highest BM (value) and lowest BM (glamour)
decile portfolios.
PANEL 1 PANEL 2 PANEL 3 PANEL 4
GS: 1,2-9, 10 CP: 9, 10- 1, 2 GS-CP: 3, 1 - 1,3 BM :9, 10- 1, 2
1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
1968 .061 .037 .046 .014 .271 .455 .105 .129 .297 .049 .189 .356
1969 .101 -.055 .200 .104 .162 .353 .085 -.129 .332 .095 .092 .336
1970 -.117 .083 .255 .124 .291 .463 -.017 .243 .451 .002 .119 .387
1971 -.060 .148 .281 -.078 .250 .509 -.145 .266 .587 -.110 .240 .529
1972 .127 .306 .590 .175 .337 .721 .214 .453 1.003 .171 .420 .855
1973 .176 .404 .658 .043 .331 .593 .180 .644 1.165 .082 .387 .587
1974 .128 .369 .508 -.001 .299 .648 .078 .405 .743 .062 .406 .845
1975 .130 .161 -.307 .134 .365 .640 .191 .469 .238 .213 .388 .237
1976 .019 -.184 -.709 .148 .468 1.012 .183 .324 .381 .110 .356 .168
1977 .014 -.203 -.182 .079 .064 .382 .037 -.152 .230 .020 -.108 -.012
1978 -.049 -.225 -.216 .036 -.147 .083 -.001 -.235 .002 -.003 -.414 -.341
1979 -.051 -.048 -.081 -.163 -.135 .122 -.163 .056 .446 -.193 -.201 .111
1980 -.077 .291 .618 -.001 .550 1.029 .038 .874 1.653 -.113 .638 1.288
1981 .140 .305 1.034 .198 .623 1.536 .222 .776 2.000 .170 .621 1.808
1982 .082 .248 1.239 -.058 .308 1.212 -.008 .417 1.823 .078 .449 1.399
1983 .032 .249 .550 .207 .300 .757 .235 .619 1.574 .207 .311 .763
1984 -.076 .082 .431 .182 .475 .762 .084 .756 1.279 .078 .410 .795
1985 -.055 .285 .498 .014 .328 .566 -.016 .604 .815 .026 .357 .544
1986 .167 .392 .101 .322 .209 .496 .077 .291
1987 .104 .268 .102 .192 .132 .361 .118 .149
1988 .029 .105 .119 .020
1989 .031 -.045 .045 -.130
TABLE 13: Performance of Portfolios in Best- and Worst-Stock-Market Months
All months in the sample are divided into 25-worst-stock-return months based on the equally-weighted index
(W25), the remaining 88-negative months other than the 25-worst (N88), the 122-positive months other than
the 25-best (P122), and the 25-best months (B25) in the sample.
Panel 1: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the pre-
formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales growth (GS). For each decile portfolio (changing every
April), panel 1 presents its average return over the W25, N88, P122, and B25 months.
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio
of previous-year's-cash-flow-tc-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP). For each decile portfolio (changing
every April), panel 2 presents its average return over the W25, N88, P122, and B25 months.
Panel 3: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All
stocks are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of
previous-year*s-cash-fiow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-5-year-
weighted-average-rank-of-sales growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2
independent classifications. For each portfolio (changing every April), panel 3 presents its average return
over the W25, N88, P122, and B25 months.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio
of end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-vaiue-of-equity (BM). For each portfolio
(changing every April), panel 4 presents its average return over the W25, N88, P122, and B25 months.
Panel 1:
GS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Index
W25 -.104 -.092 -.094 -.091 -.088 -.094 -.093 -.093 -.101 -.110 -.102
N88 -.020 -.017 -.018 -.019 -.020 -.019 -.021 -.023 -.026 -.031 -.023
P122 .042 .039 .039 .038 .036 .037 .037 .039 .038 .038 .037
B25 .134 .118 .115 .110 .106 .110 .114 .113 .114 .124 .121
Panel 2:
CP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Index
W25 -.118 -.111 -.106 -.103 -.097 -.095 -.090 -.087 -.088 -.098 -.102
N88 -.030 -.028 -.027 -.024 -.023 -.021 -.020 -.019 -.016 -.020 -.023
P122 .037 .039 .040 .038 .039 .038 .038 .038 .037 .038 .037
B25 .121
Glamour
.125 .122 .119 .116 .109 .112 .115 .119
Value
.136 .121
Panel 3:
CP 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Index
GS 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
W25 -.103 -.100 -.105 -.103 -.091 -.080 -.114 -.090 -.086 -.102
N88 -.029 -.025 -.022 -.025 -.020 -.016 -.023 -.016 -.015 -.023
P122 .038 .039 .038 .039 .038 .038 .039 .040 .040 .037
B25 .110 .115 .124 .111 .104 .113 .131 .110 .124 .121
Panel 4:
BM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Index
W25 -.112 -.110 -.104 -.100 -.097 -.091 -.093 -.092 -.098 -.102 -.102
N88 -.029 -.028 -.026 -.025 -.023 -.020 -.021 -.020 -.018 -.022 -.023
P122 .038 .040 .039 .037 .036 .037 .038 .037 .038 .039 .037
B25 .114 .114 .119 .113 .112 .113 .118 .126 .133 .148 .121
TABLE 14: Performance of Portfolios in Best and Worst Quarters Based on Real-GNP Growth
One Quarter Ahead
All quarters in the sample are divided into 4 sets: 10 quarters of the lowest- real-GNP growth
during the sample period, 34-next-lowest-real-GNP-growth quarters, 34-next-worst-growth
quarters, and 10-highest-real-GNP-growth quarters.
Panel 1: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based
on the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales-growth (GS). For each decile
portfolio (changing every April), panel 1 presents its average return in the quarter prior to the 10-
worst, 34-next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by real-GNP growth.
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based
on the ratio of previous-year' s-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP). For each
decile portfolio (changing every April), panel 2 presents its average return in the quarter prior to
the 10-worst, 34-next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by real-GNP growth.
Panel 3: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as
follows. All stocks are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top
30%) by the ratio of previous-year' s-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by
the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales-growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are
intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. For each (changing every April)
portfolio, panel 3 presents its average return in the quarter prior to the 10-worst, 34-next, 34-next,
and 10-best quarters ranked by real-GNP growth.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based
on the ratio of end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity
(BM). For each portfolio (changing every April), panel 4 presents its average return in the quarter
prior to the 10-worst, 34-next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by real-GNP growth.
Panel 1:
GS
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
1 23456789 10 AGNP
.040 .038 .022 .022 .020 .007 .017 .012 -.001 -.005 -.017
.022 .017 .015 .017 .009 .016 .017 .019 .010 .003 .000
.033 .036 .035 .037 .036 .033 .033 .033 .031 .023 .012
.140 .133 .120 .121 .125 .123 .123 .124 .127 .109 .031
Panel 2:
CP
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
Panel 3:
CP
GS
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
12 3 4 5 6
.003 .007 .004 .017 .018 .016
.001 .007 .013 .009 .013 .014
.017 .025 .031 .030 .034 .031
.101 .118 .117
Glamour
.124 .128 .132
12 3 12 3
3 3 3 2 2 2
.009 .013 .008 .014 .016 .020
.011 .011 .012 .010 .014 .023
.026 .029 .034 .029 .033 .046
7 8 9 10 AGNP
020 .025 .019 .015 -.017
009 .016 .020 .018 .000
036 .041 .041 .042 .012
136 .134 .135
Value
.132 .031
1 2 3 AGNP
1 1 1
032 .037 .041 -.017
021 .018 .027 .000
.026 .040 .046
.103 .123 .136 .107 .123 .133 .122 .140 .139
Panel 4:
BM
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 AGNP
.004 .001 .012 .018 .009 .016 .017 .028 .021 .015 -.017
.011 .008 .011 .009 .008 .010 .010 .016 .017 .012 .000
.022 .028 .027 .025 .030 .035 .036 .035 .041 .039 .012
.092 .102 .118 .117 .117 .135 .132 .141 .145 .151 .031
TABLE 15: Performance of Portfolios in Best and Worst Quarters Based on Change in Unemployment
One Quarter Ahead
All quarters in the sample are divided into 4 sets: 10 quarters of the highest growth of unemployment
during the sample period, 34-next-highest-unemployment-growth quarters, 34-next-highest-
unemployment-growth quarters, and 10-lowest-unemployment-growth quarters.
Panel 1: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on
the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales-growth (GS). For each decile portfolio
(changing every April), panel 1 presents its average return in the quarter prior to the 10-worst, 34-
next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by unemployment growth.
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on
the ratio of previous-year's-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP). For each decile
portfolio (changing every April), panel 2 presents its average return in the quarter prior to the 10-
worst, 34-next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by unemployment growth.
Panel 3: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows.
All stocks are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the
ratio of previous-year' s-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-
5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales-growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from
these 2 independent classifications. For each portfolio (changing every April), panel 3 presents its
average return in the quarter prior to the 10-worst, 34-next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by
unemployment growth.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on
the ratio of end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (BM).
For each portfolio (changing every April), panel 4 presents its average return in the quarter prior to
the 10-worst, 34-next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by unemployment growth.
Panel 1:
GS
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
1 23456789 10 AUnemp
.016 .028 .014 .022 .019 .018 .015 .013 .006 .013 .008
.023 .027 .026 .028 .024 .023 .028 .029 .024 .015 .001
.059 .047 .044 .045 .044 .044 .042 .044 .040 .030 -.002
.077 .072 .062 .059 .051 .050 .053 .050 .043 .031 -.005
Panel 2:
CP
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
Panel 3:
CP
GS
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
1 23456789
-.011 .012 .008 .014 .018 .014 .013 .022 .020 .019
.014 .021 .021 .022 .029 .026 .025 .030 .029 .023
.035 .036 .044 .041 .040 .041 .043 .048 .049 .050
.014 .030 .044 .048 .051 .057 .065 .067 .075 .085
Glamour
12 3 12
3 3 3 2 2
.008 .016 .002 .004 .015
.023 .026 .024 .021 .026
.036 .036 .043 .044 .041
Value
3 12 3
2 111
.032 .007 .021 .027
.031 .017 .033 .034
.052 .047 .050 .059
10 AUnemp
.008
.001
-.002
-.005
.012 .045 .073 .030 .053 .072 .056 .069 .087
AUnemp
.008
.001
-.002
-.005
Panel 4:
BM
Worst 10
Next Worst 34
Next Best 34
Best 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-.004 .003 .013 .010 .009 .020 .016 .023
.023 .020 .022 .023 .021 .023 .023 .030
.036 .037 .039 .035 .036 .045 .043 .044
.007 .029 .042 .041 .050 .053 .065 .070
9 10 AUnemp
.027 .012 .008
.021 .018 .001
.050 .051 -.002
.092 .090 -.005
TABLE 16: Risk Characteristics of Portfolios
For each portfolio described below, we compute using 22-year-after-the-formation returns as observations of its
beta with respect to the value-weighted index. We also compute using the 22-formation periods the standard
deviation of returns and the standard deviation of abnormal returns in the year after formation.
Panel 1: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the pre-
formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-sales-growth (GS). For each decile portfolio, panel 1 presents its
beta, standard deviation of returns, and standard deviation of abnormal returns defined above.
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
previous-year's-cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP). For each decile portfolio, panel 2 presents
its beta, standard deviation of returns, and standard deviation of abnormal returns defined above.
Panel 3: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of previous-year's-
cash-flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of-
sales-growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. For
each group of stocks, panel 3 presents its beta, standard deviation of returns, and standard deviation of
abnormal returns defined above.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
end-of-previous-year's-book-value-of-equity-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (BM). For each decile portfolio,
panel 4 presents its beta, standard deviation of returns, and standard deviation of abnormal returns defined
above.
Panel 1:
GS
Standard deviation
Standard deviation of
size-adjusted return
1 23456789 10
1.360 1.261 1.283 1.232 1.218 1.180 1.198 1.264 1.271 1.290
.253 .230 .228 .217 .213 .205 .207 .218 .221 .236
.059 .052 .048 .039 .031 .033 .032 .036 .039 .072
Equally-
Weighted
Index
1.304
.250
Panel 2:
CP
Standard deviation
Standard deviation of
size-adjusted return
Panel 3:
CP
GS
Standard deviation
Standard deviation of
size-adjusted return
Equally-
Weighted
1 23456789 10 Index
1.268 1.293 1.321 1.333 1.318 1.237 1.182 1.247 1.224 1.384 1.304
.224 .227 .239 .237 .232 .221 .212 .223 .224 .252 .250
.037 .044 .049 .036 .033 .034 .042 .036 .048 .058
1
3
2
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
3
2
1
1
2
1
3
1
Equally-
Weighted
Index
.249 1.296 1.293 1.239 1.184 1.214 1.330 1.258 1.322 1.304
.216 .232 .241 .215 .207 .213 .242 .224 .241 .250
.061 .040 .066 .049 .033 .047 .066 .047 .065
Panel 4:
BM
Standard deviation
Standard deviation of
size-adjusted return
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Equally-
Weighted
Index
1.248 1.268 1.337 1.268 1.252 1.214 1.267 1.275 1.299 1.443 1.304
.223 .223 .236 .225 .221 .214 .225 .233 .248 .276 .250
.076 .050 .040 .035 .031 .040 .035 .043 .046 .071



